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By proposing to integrate 11 existing financial 
instruments into a unified Neighbourhood, 
Development, International Cooperation 
Instrument (NDICI), the European Commission 
hopes to both simplify its spending on external 
action under the EU’s general budget for  
2021-2027 and make it more effective. Can the 
NDICI – by overcoming unnecessary budgetary 
fragmentation and overlap – also be an 
instrument facilitating the Union’s ‘integrated 
approach’ to external conflict and crisis? As the 
proposal now stands, there are still a number of 
blind spots that could undermine its effective 
contribution to a multidimensional, multi-level, 
multilateral and multi-phased approach to 
address fragility and instability in third countries.  
The current external financing instruments of the 
EU, as established under the 2014-2020 
multiannual financial framework (MFF), have 
struggled to provide enough coherence and 
flexibility in responding to today’s quickly shifting 
context. In the face of mounting instability in the 
neighbourhood (and beyond) and a sharp 
increase in refugee flows and migration, the key 
finding of a mid-term self-assessment by the 
Commission was the need for “more strategic 
and overarching programming” and “coherent 
interactions at the operational level in the 
renewed international context”. The need for 
flexibility and the problem of silo approaches 
similarly figure in an externally evaluated 
Coherence report and the European Parliament’s 
implementation assessment. 
In an effort to address these recommendations, 
the Commission has come up with a new and 
bold proposal for future spending on issues 
relating to the neighbourhood, development and 
international cooperation. By merging the 11 
existing instruments outlined below (cf. Table 1) 
into one financial instrument, the NDICI seeks to 
increase simplification, coherence, 
responsiveness and strategic direction in EU 
external action. 
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Table 1. Comparison between current programmes and the NDICI proposal, taking into account Brexit 
(EU27) and the budgeting of the European Development Fund. 
MFF 2014-20  
€70.1 + 6.9 billion1 
MFF 2021-27  
€89.2 billion  
11 instruments 
= European Neighbourhood Instrument, European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human rights, Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace, Development 
Cooperation Instrument, Partnership Instrument for 
Cooperation with Third Countries, Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation, Macro-Financial Assistance, External 
Lending Mandate, Guarantee Fund for External Action, 
European Fund for Sustainable Development and European 
Development Fund (excluding African Peace Facility). 
1 instrument, 4 components  
= Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation 
(NDICI) 
Geographic Programmes €57,568 million 
(74.8%) 
Geographic Programmes €68,000 million (76%) 
Neighbourhood €17,693 million  
(30.7%) 
Neighbourhood €22,000 million  
(32%) 
- Sub-Saharan Africa  €26,097 million  
(45.3%) 
- Sub-Saharan Africa  €32,000 million  
(47%) 
- Asia and the Pacific €9,819 million  
(17.1%) 
- Asia and the Pacific €10,000 million  
(15%) 
- The Americas and Caribbean €3,959 million  
(6.9%) 
- The Americas and Caribbean €4,000 million  
(6%) 
Thematic Programmes €9,139 million (11.9%) Thematic Programmes €7,000 million  
(8%) 
- Human rights and Democracy  €1,302 million  
(14.24%) 
- Human rights and Democracy  €1,500 million  
(22%) 
- Civil Society Organisations  €1,414 million  
(15.5%) 
- Civil Society Organisations  €1,500 million  
(21%) 
- Stability and Peace  €706 million  
(7.7%) 
- Stability and Peace  €1,000 million  
(14%) 
Global Challenges €5,716 million  
(62.5%) 
Global Challenges €3,000 million  
(43%) 
Rapid Response Pillar €3,407 million 
(4.4%) 
Rapid Response Pillar €4,000 million  
(5%) 
Emerging Challenges and 
Priorities Cushion  
€6,869 million (8.9%) Emerging Challenges and 
Priorities Cushion 
€10,200 million 
(11%) 
Source: Adapted from data from the Secretariat of the Committee on Budgets, as included in the December 2018 European 
Parliament Briefing A new neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instrument.
While meritorious from a coherence-seeking 
perspective, the desire to simplify the EU’s 
financial toolbox and increase the Commission’s 
flexibility in spending has raised concerns among 
various parts of the EU’s apparatus and member 
states alike. How will a unified instrument reflect 
the privileged relationship of the neighbourhood 
with the EU? What will the governance structure 
and operationalisation of the instrument look 
like? How likely is it that the NDICI will survive 
broader MFF negotiations in the Council? These 
are some key questions that observers have 
                                                     
1  The 70.1 billion euro budget for 2014-20, as estimated for the EU27, does not include the budget for emerging challenges 
and priorities, as the latter is not necessarily funded under the MFF.  
2  The integrated approach aims to address all conflict dimensions – ranging from security challenges to development concerns 
over economic grievances – during all phases of the conflict, from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction. To effectively 
implement such an approach, the EU wishes to coordinate and cooperate with all relevant actors at a local, national, regional 
and global level. The integrated approach is further outlined in a joint communication on Resilience (JOIN(2017)21) by the 
European Commission and the HR/VP and a working document (EEAS/COM(2017)8) on “The EU Integrated Approach to 
external conflicts and crises” of the EEAS and the European Commission, both released in June 2017. 
addressed in various analyses of the proposed 
jumbo instrument.  
An underexposed angle in the existing body of 
commentary is how the NDICI relates to the EU’s 
commitment to an “integrated approach to 
conflict and crisis”. Outlined in the EU’s Global 
Strategy (EUGS) of 2016 as one of the priorities 
for EU external action, the EU has committed to 
addressing global instability and fragility in a 
holistic way, deploying all its relevant policies, 
players and tools in an integrated and well-
coordinated manner.2 Pooled funding and joint 
financial instruments can be seen as a way of 
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facilitating the implementation of this kind of 
integrated approach.  
While the preamble (recital 8) outlines a 
commitment to the five priorities enshrined in the 
Global Strategy, the proposal does not mention 
the integrated approach explicitly. References 
are however made to “a more geographically and 
thematically comprehensive approach”, by 
tackling policies in a “trans-regional, multi-
sectoral and global way”, with a goal of breaking 
down “silos” (our italics). But in what ways does 
the NDICI regulation actually live up to facilitating 
a multidimensional, multi-level, multilateral and 
multi-phased approach to conflict and crisis? 
Multidimensional 
The integrated approach is multidimensional, 
drawing on “all available policies and instruments 
aimed at conflict prevention, management and 
resolution”, bringing together diplomatic 
engagement, CSDP missions and operations, 
development cooperation and humanitarian 
assistance. (EUGS, 2016: 28) 
Merging financial assistance for neighbourhood, 
development and international cooperation 
agendas under the NDICI should facilitate the 
financial implementation of a multidimensional 
approach to crises. However, one wonders how  
‘integrated’ the NDICI actually is given that the 
budgets for, for example, the Neighbourhood 
(under its geographic pillar) or Peace and 
Stability (under its thematic pillar) remain ring-
fenced (cf. Table 1). Moreover, the NDICI 
                                                     
3  The EU Treaty (article 41.2 TEU) does not allow the Union’s budget to be used for military or defence purposes. 
4  As outlined in section 2.1 of the EU Consensus on Humanitarian aid.  
5  Blockmans, S. (2018), “The EU’s modular approach to defence integration: An inclusive, ambitious and legally binding 
PESCO?”, Common Market Law Review, 55(6), 1785-1826. 
proposal does not cover all dimensions of EU 
external action spending. For one, CSDP 
operations and military capacity-building for 
CFSP objectives cannot be included under the 
EU budget (and hence under the NDICI) due to 
limitations enshrined in the EU Treaty.3 Similarly, 
humanitarian aid resides outside the NDICI’s 
scope in compliance with the humanitarian 
principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
independence.4 Sufficient coordination between 
the NDICI, the ECHO budget (including the EU’s 
Emergency Aid Reserve) and different types of 
security funding will therefore be key.  
In fact, four different security-related instruments 
and funds are currently on the table for  
2021-2027: the NDICI, the CFSP budget, the 
European Peace Facility and the European 
Defence Fund (cf. Table 2). While the NDICI and 
the CFSP budget seek principally to finance soft 
security needs, the proposed European Peace 
Facility caters for CSDP operations with military 
and defence objectives and the European 
Defence Fund aims to encourage the 
development and operationalisation of joint 
defence capabilities among member states.5 The 
envisaged split between the NDICI and other 
funds will continue to hamper the type of ‘civ-mil’ 
coordination that a truly integrated, nimble and 
effective approach to external conflict and crisis 
require 
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Table 2. List of security, defence, military instruments and funds 
EU financial instruments and funds relating to security and defence 
2014-20 2021-27 proposals 
 Financial 
instrument 
Funding 
Source 
Scope Financial 
instrument 
Funding Source Scope 
1. Instrument 
contributing 
to Stability 
and Peace 
(IcSP) 
EU budget  
€2,339 million 
under current 
MFF. 
Supporting of security 
initiatives and peace-
building activities in 
partner countries, with 
no military or defence 
purposes. 
Includes Capacity 
Building in support of 
Security and 
Development 
(CBSD), with 
objectives in the field 
of development and 
human security. 
Included in the 
Neighbourhood, 
Development 
and 
International 
Cooperation 
Instrument 
(NDICI) 
EU budget  
€1,000 million is 
specifically allocated 
under next MFF for 
peace and stability 
(as part of the 
thematic pillar), but 
the NDICI also 
includes unallocated 
and more flexible 
spending in this 
realm 
(cf. Table 3). 
Includes conflict, peace 
and stability actions in 
geographic and thematic 
programmes on the one 
hand and in rapid response 
and emergency on the 
other hand (cf. Table 3). 
Does include CBSD, with 
objectives in the field of 
development and human 
security.6  
2. CFSP budget 
provisions 
within EU 
budget 
EU budget  
€2,338 million 
under current 
MFF. 
Financing of 
administrative costs 
of all CSDP missions 
and the operational 
costs of Civilian 
CSDP.7 
CFSP budget 
provisions 
within EU 
budget 
EU budget 
€3,000 million under 
the next MFF, 
outside the NDICI. 
Financing of administrative 
costs of all CSDP missions 
and the operational costs 
of Civilian CSDP. 
3. Athena 
Mechanism 
Off budget  
Annual share by 
MS, excluding 
Denmark. 
Limited budget.8 
Financing of common 
operational costs of 
military operations 
under CSDP. 
European 
Peace Facility 
 
Off budget 
€10,500 million, to 
be 
financed by MS, 
excluding Denmark. 
Enables the financing of 
operational actions (e.g. 
EU or partners’ military 
operations) under CFSP 
that have military or 
defence implications (cf. 
art. 41.2 TEU).  
Is not restricted to Africa. 
Brings together former 
Athena Mechanism and 
African Peace Facility. Also 
includes CBSD, with 
objectives in the field of 
CFSP (in support of 
countries’ armed forces).9  
 African 
Peace 
Facility 
Off budget 
€1,662.5 million 
for 2014-2018,10 
funded by MS 
(excluding 
Denmark) as 
part of 11th 
European 
Development 
Fund. 
Supports the African 
Union’s and African 
Regional Economic 
Communities’ efforts 
in the area of peace 
and security. 
Includes capacity 
building, early 
response 
mechanisms and 
support to Peace 
Support Operations in 
Africa. 
4.    European 
Defence Fund 
Partly funded by EU 
budget  
€13 billion under the 
next MFF and partly 
funded by MS 
contributions. 
Looks to increase 
coordination of investment 
amongst MS throughout 
the industrial cycle (from 
research to development of 
prototypes to acquisition of 
defence capabilities). 
Includes financing of 
priority projects agreed by 
MS within the framework of 
CSDP and NATO. 
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
                                                     
6  The proposal of the European Peace Facility (HR(2018)94) outlines: “Current provisions on Capacity Building of military actors 
in support of Development and Security for Development (CBSD) as set out in the Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace, provide for actions which mainly pursue objectives in the field of development. The Peace Facility will be able to 
finance capacity building activities in support of third countries’ armed forces in pursuit of CFSP objectives”. However, it is 
still being discussed how CBSD will take shape exactly under both the NDICI and the European Peace Facility. 
7  Ibid. 
8   In 2014, for five military operations, the Athena budget was estimated at around €78 million.  
9  Ibid. 
10  This is the sum of the €1,030.5 million committed under the 2014-2016 Action Programme and the €592 million committed 
under the 2017-2018 Action Programme. The APF budget for 2019-20 is not yet available. 
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Multi-level 
The integrated approach is multi-level, acting to 
address the complexity of conflicts “at the local, 
national, regional and global levels”.  
(EUGS, 2016: 29) 
The NDICI proposal seeks to improve coherence 
between geographic and thematic interventions, 
by transferring most (global) thematic actions 
into (country-based or regional) geographic 
programmes.11 Despite the intention to shrink 
thematic programming, clarifications will be 
needed about how coherence will be achieved 
between peace and security interventions 
financed under bilateral and regional envelopes 
and those facilitated by the Stability and Peace 
thematic programme. Moreover, while it makes 
sense to invest more in geographic programmes, 
given that these are tailor-made and have proven 
to be most effective, such approach raises 
concerns about support for local level actors. 
Since geographic programming and 
implementation takes place via bilateral or 
regional cooperation, national governments and 
public authorities will have to endorse the 
decentralisation of allocations to, for example, 
local authorities, local councils or local civil 
society organisations. In countries mired in 
conflict, repression and authoritarianism, this 
approach may prevent some local-level actors 
from having guaranteed access to EU support 
under the geographic pillar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11  A key motivation for bringing the NDICI into existence was to improve coherence between geographic and thematic 
interventions. In today’s budget, there has been overlap and inconsistent responses at the country-level due to missing 
synergies between (country-based) geographic and (global) thematic financial instruments. Therefore, the NDICI proposes to 
transfer a number of thematic actions to the geographic programmes, with the latter now representing three quarters of the 
instrument. The remaining thematic actions (only 8% of the NDICI) would then cover those issues that are better dealt with at 
the global rather than country level. 
12  Cf. Article 10 of the Commission’s proposal (COM(2018) 460). 
13  Cf. Article 11.6 of the Commission’s proposal (COM(2018) 460). 
14  Debuysere, L. and Blockmans, S. (2019), “Crisis responders: Comparing policy approaches of the EU, UN, NATO and 
OSCE with experiences in the field”, European Foreign Affairs Review 24(3), forthcoming. 
Multilateral 
The integrated approach is multilateral, 
engaging all players “present in a conflict and 
necessary for its resolution, partnering more 
systematically on the ground with regional and 
international organisations, bilateral donors and 
civil society”, to build sustainable peace “through 
comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, 
deep and durable regional and international 
partnerships”. (EUGS, 2016: 29) 
Generally speaking, the NDICI regulation 
outlines that programming takes place in 
cooperation with partner countries or regions, 
and preferably through joint programming with 
EU member states. Joint programming with other 
donors and consultation with representatives of 
civil society and local authorities shall take place 
“where relevant”.12 More specifically, when 
drawing up programming documents with partner 
countries and regions struck by conflict and 
crisis, the proposal stipulates that: 
“(…) due account shall be taken of the special 
needs and circumstances of the countries or 
regions concerned. (…) special emphasis shall 
be placed on stepping up coordination amongst 
all relevant actors to help the transition from an 
emergency situation to the development 
phase”.13  
The proposal remains vague, however, as to with 
whom and how financial coordination will be 
consolidated in conflict zones. For example, 
there is no explicit mention of joint programming 
or co-financing with the UN, despite the latter 
being the EU’s core strategic partner in the field 
of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.14 
Vagueness about “effective multilateralism” also 
predominates at an inter- and intra-institutional 
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EU level. A truly integrated approach to conflict 
and crisis will require increased coordination 
both within the Commission (e.g. in the 
Commissioners’ Group on External Action),15 the 
Council (between all relevant working parties) 
and the Parliament (between AFET and DEVE in 
particular), as well as between these institutions. 
As it now stands, however, attempts to move the 
management of external financing instruments 
(like the NDICI) from different line DGs and FPI 
(co-located in the EEAS) to DG DEVCO signals 
an intended concentration of power of the purse, 
which is anathema to the philosophy of 
multilateralism within the EU’s own apparatus.16 
 
Multi-phased 
The integrated approach is multi-phased, 
allowing the EU to act “at all stages of the conflict 
cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding 
responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in 
stabilisation, and avoiding premature 
disengagement when a new crisis erupts”.  
(EUGS, 2016: 28) 
                                                     
15  Blockmans, S. and Russack, S. (2015), “The Commissioners’ Group on External Action - Key political facilitator”, CEPS 
Special Report No. 125, 17 December. 
16 Insight gleaned from interviews with current and former EU officials. 
17  An additional question to be asked is how existing Trust Funds will relate to the NDICI. 
Under its different pillars, the NDICI provides 
financial assistance for all phases of the conflict 
cycle (cf. Table 3). However, given that the 
NDICI is to be employed in a flexible manner in 
line with policy priorities, some phases of the 
conflict cycle risk being gradually overlooked in 
favour of quick responses to unforeseeable 
challenges and crises. As such, short-term 
foreign policy interests, such as stopping 
migration flows, may trump longer-term 
preventive approaches to conflict.17 Further 
clarification regarding the flexible short-, mid- 
and long-term deployment and impact of, 
particularly, the Rapid Response Pillar and the 
Emergency Cushion is therefore imperative.  
At the intersection of a multilateral and a multi-
phased approach to conflict and crisis lies a 
difficult balancing act of reconciling complex 
‘multilateral’ coordination with the need for 
responsive crisis intervention. While the rapid 
response pillar and the emergency cushion do 
not require time-consuming programming, 
clarification is needed on how swift coordination 
between key EU (e.g. DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, 
EU Delegations) and non-EU (e.g. UN, NATO, 
OSCE) players will take place under these two 
envelopes, in order to avoid increasing delays in 
responding responsibly and decisively in crisis 
situations. 
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Table 3. Funding specifically allocated for issues relating to Conflict, Peace and Stability under the NDICI 
Specific Conflict, Peace and Stability actions under the NDICI 
Geographic Programmes  
=  one out of five pillars within the Geographic programmes specifically tackles  
Peace cooperation (i.e. Security, Stability and Peace) in all 4 designated regions 
(Neighbourhood, Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia and the Pacific, The Americas and Caribbean) 
 People 
 Planet 
 Prosperity 
 Peace including resilience building, conflict prevention, early warning, peacebuilding, 
SSR support, capacity-building of military actors (CBSD), countering radicalisation… 
 Partnership 
Unclear what share  
of the overall  
€68,000 million of  
the budget for geographic 
programmes will  
be used for the  
‘Peace’ pillar 
Thematic Programmes 
=  one of the four thematic pillars deals with ‘Stability and Peace’ 
 Human rights and Democracy  
 Civil Society Organisations  
 Stability and Peace includes (1) assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and 
crisis preparedness and (2) addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging 
threats 
 Global Challenges 
€1,000 million of the 
overall €7,000 million is 
ring-fenced for ‘Stability 
and Peace’ 
Rapid Response Pillar 
=  quick responses, including (1) actions contributing to stability and conflict prevention in 
situations of urgency, emerging crisis, crisis and post-crisis; (2) actions contributing to 
resilience building and the humanitarian-development nexus; and (3) actions addressing 
foreign policy needs and priorities 
Unclear what share of the 
overall €4,000 million will 
go to which phase of the 
conflict cycle 
Emerging Challenges and Priorities Cushion 
=  to be decided 
The €10,200 million is 
unallocated to ensure 
flexibility 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on the Commission’s proposal (COM(2018) 460). 
 
Towards an integrated financial instrument? 
Looking at it from the angle of an integrated 
approach to conflict and crisis, there lies a 
paradox at the heart of the current NDICI 
proposal. On the one hand, by streamlining all 
instruments into a flexible, single instrument, 
there is a risk that certain conflict dimensions, 
levels or phases will outweigh others, for 
example under political pressure of serving the 
EU’s direct internal and external interests. As 
such, a joint instrument risks undermining a truly 
holistic approach. On the other hand, however,  
 
 
an integrated financial approach would be 
equally undermined if the solution for this 
problem is to install excessive ring-fencing within 
the NDICI, nullifying the philosophy of integration 
in the process. A difficult balance between 
merging instruments while preserving 
comprehensive action needs to be struck if the 
NDICI is to facilitate a genuine, rather than a 
merely cosmetic, integrated approach to conflict 
and crisis. Indeed, simplification is the most 
difficult thing to do.  
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End Note 
The commentary was written in the framework of 
a new research project in which the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung and CEPS Centre for European Policy 
Studies have joined forces. The project aims to 
assess whether, how and with what success 
whole-of-government approaches (WGAs) are 
implemented in external action of the EU and its 
member states. The underlying interest is to find 
out whether WGAs have, as intended, led to 
more political coherence and thus to better policy 
outcomes in dealing with external conflict and 
crisis.  
 
We thank both authors Loes Debuysere, 
Researcher, and Steven Blockmans, Senior 
Research Fellow and Head of EU Foreign Policy 
Unit, at the Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels for this commentary. 
 
Impressum  
© Februar 2019  
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256  
33311 Gütersloh  
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de  
DOI: 10.11586/2019012 
Cover: © Getty Images/iStockphoto/selimaksan 
 
Responsible 
Stefani Weiss 
Senior Expert 
Programme Europe´s Future 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Phone +32 2 256 75 98 
Mobile  +49 160 913 298 78 
stefani.weiss@bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en 
